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ABSTRACT
This article in its essence aims to challenge and unfold, each at a time, two differ-
ent fields of methodology – cybernetics and phenomenology – that have direct effects 
on the product of being and the process of becoming in architectural discourse. 
Furthermore, this article suggests a third way philosophy for architecture that 
relates notions of post-phenomenology and technoscience, and considers both to be 
equally vital to development and speculation within current architectural discourse. 
First, the history of each of the two fields – cybernetics and phenomenology – will be 
unveiled with a focus on exploring their impact upon architecture in particular and 
diverse fields such as other art disciplines, computer science and psychology. Second, 
a critique of the historic rivalry between pioneers in each of the two fields will be 
unpacked through their errors and limits. Third, the article will discuss attempts at 
converging the two fields in order to address the relationship of notions of human-
ism, machinism and technology. Finally, a declaration of the characteristics of such 
a convergence that will lead to a third way philosophy for architectural discourse 
will be asserted. 
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INTRODUCTION
The first documented use of the term kybernetike dates back to 400 BC, and is 
found in Plato’s philosophical essay ‘The Republic’ in an attempt to describe 
the art of navigation. In 1834, this early description of the term formed the 
basis for André-Marie Ampère’s foundation for the classification of sciences: 
The future science of government should be called la cybernétique (Mackay 1991). 
In 1948 Norbert Wiener (1961) subsequently adopted this later use of the term 
where he gave the study of control and communication in the animal and 
the machine the name cybernetics. Since then cybernetics has evolved from 
the first-order cybernetics concerned with the behaviour of machines and 
self-regulating systems, to the second-order cybernetics that extended to the 
involvement of the observer, his or her behaviour and consciousness as influ-
ential contributing participants in the system (von Foerster 1979). Cybernetics 
became widely known in the second half of the twentieth century after the 
series of Macy Conferences held mainly in New York City between the years 
1946 and 1953, where heated debate and discussions took place, exposing 
relations and issues of interdisciplinarity between cybernetics as a major field 
of influence and the rise of other fields such as systems theory, emergence 
and interactive technologies (Herr 2010). This wave of interest in cybernetic 
thought impacted many fields in the arts and architecture. One of the early 
advocates and educators of the second-order cybernetics in the field of inter-
active arts is Roy Ascott (1961). His artwork ‘Change-Paintings’, exhibited in 
Molton Gallery in London in 1961, was one of the early pieces of art that 
demonstrated the need for participatory interaction from the audience for 
what is ultimately an open-ended piece of work. Simultaneously in architec-
ture, the cybernetician Gordon Pask worked on several architectural projects 
alongside architects such as Cedric Price and John Frazer, implementing 
cybernetic thinking into architecture to achieve environments that respond to 
their inhabitants through change and interactivity. 
Similarly to the history of cybernetics, the history of phenomenology was 
rooted in the philosophy of the early sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
Renaissance before its modern use by Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. 
The Renaissance scholars’ ethos of the search for humanist methods for realism 
and particularly in the arts has extended to Hegel’s idealist account of reality 
that was the basis for the early involvement of phenomenology in philosophy. 
At the same time they expected of the field of art a constant process of tech-
nical involvement – not in order to de-anthropomorphize art […] but in order to 
render its human truth complete (Heller 1978: 411).
Throughout history, phenomenology has developed and taken different 
directions. The transcendental basis in particular was founded by Edmund 
Husserl at the start of the twentieth century, and subsequently applied to 
varied topics such as time, space, causality, aesthetics, psychology and sociol-
ogy. This soon diverted into the level of philosophy, a philosophy of existence 
under the ontological and existential phenomenology of Martin Heidegger 
that discusses consciousness, being and subjectivity, notions explored further 
by Sartre. This later became the main fascination of Merleau-Ponty, who 
attempted to explain ontological philosophy in relation to human sciences by 
adopting the notion of embodiment to lay the foundation for phenomenology 
and perception (Macann 2007).
The phenomenological chronicle did not end with the philosophical 
account, but extended to reach the field of science and in particular the study of 
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actual statistical and mechanical analysis of phenomena known as phenomeno-
logical thermodynamics (Cerbone 2006: 1). Thus, phenomenology has contem-
plated technology and its relationship to cybernetics since its early existence; 
however, this relationship has become the subject of much passionate debate 
and discussion for decades, beginning with the writings of Heidegger (1977b) 
regarding the distinction between the technological and the essence of tech-
nology and fuelled by the writings of Norbert Wiener.
Until the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
the subject of technology was connected to mere construction techniques, and 
by the mid-twentieth century and with the invention of the first developed 
computer, technology shifted to the design tools and later on to processes of 
design. This is true not only in the field of art but also in architecture. At the 
same time, computer scientists such as Terry Winograd were focusing on the 
influence of cybernetic methodology, and also investigated the understand-
ing of what it is to be human, a question deeply rooted in phenomenological 
thought (Winograd and Flores 1986).
All new technologies develop within the background of a tacit under-
standing of human nature and human work. The use of technology 
in turn leads to fundamental changes in what we do, and ultimately 
is what it is to be human. We encounter the deep questions of design 
when we recognize that in designing tools we are designing ways of 
being. By confronting these questions directly, we can develop a new 
background for understanding computer technology – one that can lead 
to important advances in the design and use of computer systems. 
(Winograd and Flores 1986: xi)
Computer scientists developed arguments connecting cybernetics to phenom-
enology through the writings of Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamar and other 
phenomenologists whose work was primarily concerned with interpreting the 
workings of the mind by drawing a distinction between the thing-in-itself and 
the phenomenon it presents to us (Sharoff 1995).
I cannot explore my soul as a thing-in-itself by means of theoreti-
cal reasoning (still less by means of empirical observation); hence, I 
cannot explore free will as a feature of a being […]. Nevertheless, I can 
think about freedom, that is, the representation of it is at least without 
contradictions. 
(Kant [1787] 1965)
In essence the connections between the thing-in-itself and its representation, 
the connections between our consciousness and the possibility of creating 
artificial consciousness, are exactly what computer scientists and particularly 
Artificial Intelligence experts are interested in exploring. Winograd asserts 
the involvement of phenomenology and its theory of interpretations known 
as hermeneutics in the development of understanding cognition in computer 
science as a field (Winograd and Flores 1986: 38). Such interests originated 
from the writings of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela through their 
investigation into neurophysiology, cybernetics and the organization of living 
systems, and their search for an understanding of the biological processes 
that can give rise to the phenomenon of cognition (Varela 1979; Maturana 
and Varela 1980). Similarly, Heinz von Foerster (2002) wrote extensively 
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about the relationship between cybernetics, cognition and perception through 
the involvement of technology and machine intelligence in his essays in 
Understanding Understanding.
Other disciplines that crossed between cybernetics and phenomenology 
with their different trajectories are neuroscience, psychology and active percep-
tion. Pioneers such as Hermann von Helmholtz (1962) and Richard Gregory 
(1997) stretched and blurred previously well-defined thresholds between the 
two methodologies in their explanations of the phenomenon known as errors 
of perception or illusion through brain models and theories of vision.
This brief scan over history is not only intended to provide a snippet of 
background of the two fields in question, but is also an attempt to assert the 
rootedness of their existence first alongside each other and second in opposition 
to one another, explained in the next section with their relation to architecture; 
their main conflict comes in the form of dispute over the meaning and the extent 
of the involvement of technology in our daily lives, existence and consciousness. 
BETWEEN CYBERNETICS AND PHENOMENOLOGY
Previous attempts at understanding the convergence between cybernetics 
and phenomenology as fields of influence or their trajectories onto archi-
tecture were explored by Sanford Kwinter (2002) (Professor of Architectural 
Theory and Criticism, Department of Architecture, Harvard Graduate School 
of Design) in his book Architectures of Time. Such explorations might not be 
as explicit as this research is attempting to achieve, but nevertheless Kwinter’s 
writings and theory are deeply concerned with the cybernetic approach of 
complex dynamic systems. Featured in many recent philosophical movements, 
and relevant to the notions of immanence and individuation derived from 
the philosophy of Gilbert Simondon that later influenced the philosophies of 
both Gilles Deleuze and Bernard Stiegler, Kwinter developed a theory of time 
that is based on a materialist approach to movement and time rather than 
space and time. Kwinter (2002: 214) asserts that the dynamism of such philo-
sophical and cosmological systems serves as the principle of infinite potential 
possibilities that when combined redefine what Kwinter termed the ontology 
of the event. Kwinter’s theory of time bridges two main networks of connec-
tions: the first on a cybernetic phenomenological level between theories of 
complex systems and Heidegger’s ideology of time; and the second on a level 
of dynamic difference positioned between the philosophies of Heidegger in 
Being and Time and those of Alain Badiou in Being and Event. 
The event is not actually internal to the analytic of the multiple. Even 
though it can always be localized within presentation, it is not, as such, 
presented, nor is it presentable. It is – not being – supernumerary. 
(Badiou 2007a: 178)
Badiou’s conception of the multiple parallels Heidegger’s thinking regarding 
the terms earth and world in his exploration of difference. Badiou speaks of the 
event, which belongs to conceptual construction:
[…], in the double sense that it can only be thought by anticipating its 
abstract form, and it can only be revealed in the retroaction of an inter-
ventional practice which is itself entirely thought through.
(Badiou 2007a: 178)
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While Richard Coyne explains Heidegger’s acknowledgment of the difference 
between earth and world as:
[…], the earth is that which is not knowable. What it brings forth 
(reveals) it also conceals. Earth offers the greatest resistance to the open-
ness (truth) made possible by the work of art. World is well understood 
in terms of the culture of a people, in the sense of Hegel’s idea of an 
epoch. So, the earth conceals, whereas the world reveals. 
(Coyne 1995: 196)
Coyne reflects on the phenomenology of virtual reality in relation to 
Heidegger’s definition of the difference between earth and world in an attempt 
to not only find parallels between the two trains of thought, but also to expose 
Heidegger’s limitations towards thinking about technology and the essence of 
technology in our current time. While questioning the essence of the operation 
of difference in the case of computer technology such as virtual reality Coyne 
(1995: 197, 200) asserts that:
The technology reveals, discloses, and opens up a world, but not prima-
rily in the sense expected by virtual-reality writers. The world is disclosed 
through difference. […]. 
Recognizing difference within the play of metaphors opens up the possi-
bility of new metaphors. The issue of difference brings us back again to 
Heidegger’s notion of disclosure. Our discussion of virtual reality brings 
us to a consideration of metaphor and of difference, which clearly play a 
role in how we understand information technology.
The identification of the close interlinked processes, of feedback and circu-
larity between metaphors and difference in reality and those of virtual reality 
identified by Coyne, has contributed a great deal to the convergence between 
cybernetics, information technology and phenomenology in architecture. 
Similarly, Christopher Hight (2008) in his book Architectural Principles in the 
Age of Cybernetics does exactly that with a clear declaration of the links and 
shifts found between the Renaissance and mid-twentieth-century architec-
ture as well as current tendencies towards post-humanism and digital interac-
tivity in design. Hight (2008: 194–95) put forward a discussion of the theories 
of form in architecture not in the sense of formalism, but in the relation-
ship between architectural thought and production of processes that rely 
on the dialectic history of preserving the body of architectural knowledge 
formed in the late nineteenth century, as well as on celebrating its ontology 
through the effects of technology. Thus, Hight (2008: 195) is neither surren-
dering to the thoughts of the phenomenologists and their antagonistic views 
towards the degree of involvement of technology in the body of architecture, 
nor to the post-structuralists’ desire to conserve it. However, he is asserting 
Heidegger’s notion of difference in relation to Coyne’s notion of metaphor 
and Kwinter’s notion of event by exposing the historical ambiguity of the 
body in relation to architecture: 
There is no need to dream of the day that humanist architecture and its 
subject might be erased. The figure of the anthropos was never so clearly 
drawn. Its contours were not etched in a sandy firmament soon to be 
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washed away by the tides of history, but are indeed more like the turbu-
lent flow of the waves themselves, emerging as momentary singulari-
ties, vortices measurable only amidst the laminar and nonlinear flows 
of history. It is within this turbulent space of formation that architec-
ture and its subjects whirl. And it is within this immanence that we can 
measure resistances and currents to surf alternative tangents. 
(2008: 195)
According to the architectural historian Alberto Pérez-Gómez (1983: 325), 
contemporary phenomenology has revealed that technological theory alone 
cannot resolve the fundamental problems of architecture disillusioned with 
rational utopias and obsessed with reason over imagination. Thereafter, he 
confirms the foolishness of denying the ever present enigma of the human condi-
tion that he relates directly to intuition and mystery, which he calls upon 
architects to directly address (1983: 326).
Part of our human condition is the inevitable yearning to capture reality 
through metaphors. Such is true knowledge, ambiguous yet ultimately 
more relevant than scientific truth. And architecture, no matter how 
much it resists the idea, cannot renounce its origin in intuition. While 
construction as a technological process is prosaic – deriving directly 
from a mathematical equation, a functional diagram, or a rule of formal 
combinations – architecture is poetic, necessarily an abstract order but 
in itself a metaphor emerging from a vision of the world and Being. 
(Pérez-Gómez 1983: 326)
Significantly, what is in question here is the impact and the level of involve-
ment of technology and technological theory in our life in general and archi-
tecture in particular. It seems that philosophers and theorists who criticized 
the involvement of technology in our society embraced the Heideggerian 
philosophy embedded in the phenomenological ideologies, and those who 
supported the transient evolution of technology that comes from cybernet-
ics have accepted infinite involvement of the machine and later on prosthetic 
beings as agents of equal participation to humans in any system. However, 
regardless of the degree of involvement that technology is pursuing, this 
article is attempting to emphasize the importance of the integration of both 
ideologies – the phenomenological and the cybernetic – and the embedded 
significance of understanding the principles and processes of becoming, rather 
than the mere focus on the outcome as being. 
Heidegger (1962: 2) pioneered the question of the ontological ground of being 
in Being and Time. He argues that we do not know what we mean by the term 
Being, as it has been overwhelmed by the preconceptions of western metaphysical 
philosophy since Plato’s time. Therefore, in Being and Time Heidegger (1962: 1) 
embarks on a process of defining the meaning of Being concretely, and does so 
with reference to time as he considers it to be the possible horizon for any under-
standing whatsoever of being. A pre-understanding suggests that the meaning of 
Being is the most universal concept of existence for any entity. However, Heidegger 
(1962: 22) asserts that the universality of Being is not attached to a certain class or 
genus, but is rather a temporary condition of possibility for any entity.
[…] the concept of Being is indefinable. This is deduced from its supreme 
universality, and rightly so, […]. Being cannot indeed be conceived as an 
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entity; […] nor can it acquire such a character as to have the term entity 
applied to it. 
(Heidegger 1962: 23)
Something like Being has been disclosed in the understanding-of-Being 
which belongs to existent Dasein as a way in which it understands. Being 
has been disclosed in a preliminary way, though non-conceptually; 
and this makes it possible for Dasein as existent Being-in-the-world to 
comport itself towards entities – towards those which it encounters with-
in-the-world as well as towards itself as existent.
(Heidegger 1962: 488)
Deleuze tangles the two notions, being and time, into the concept of becoming. 
Together with Felix Guattari, Deleuze attempts, in Becoming-Intense, Becoming-
Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible, to reinterpret the essence of Becoming through 
the memories of a Moviegoer, a Naturalist, a Bergsonian, a Sorcerer, a Theologian, 
a Spinozist, a Molecule and others (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 256–341).
[…] a becoming lacks a subject distinct from itself; but also it has no 
term, since its term in turn exists only as taken up in another becoming 
of which it is the subject, and which coexists, forms a block, with the 
first. This is the principle according to which there is a reality specific to 
becoming (the Bergsonian idea of a coexistence of very different dura-
tions, superior or inferior to ours, all of them in communication). 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 262–63)
To some extent, it appears that Deleuze’s concept of Becoming is very close 
to Heidegger’s meaning of Being as Being-on-the-way (Badiou 2007b). 
Contemporary continental philosopher Alain Badiou (2007a) has dedicated 
a great deal to mapping out the parallels between Heidegger’s meaning of 
Being and Time and Deleuze’s Becoming and Event. Furthermore, Badiou (2000) 
identifies the close relationships between Heidegger’s and Deleuze’s philoso-
phy in that Being and Becoming are essentially interpretive thought. However, 
Deleuze and Guattari in What is Philosophy? state a clear distinction between 
time and event.
It is no longer time that exists between two instants, it is the event that 
is a meanwhile [un entre-temps]: the meanwhile is not part of the eternal, 
but neither is it part of time – it belongs to becoming. The meanwhile, 
the event, is always a dead time; it is there where nothing takes place, an 
infinite awaiting that is already infinitely past, awaiting ad reserve. This 
dead time does not come after what happens; it coexists with the instant 
or time of the accident, but as the immensity of the empty time in which 
we see it as still to come and as having already happened, in the strange 
indifference of an intellectual intuition. All the meanwhiles are superim-
posed on one another, whereas times succeed each other. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 158)
Deleuze (1988) criticizes Heidegger’s limits of the interpretation of conscious-
ness and intentionality, arguing that intentional relations derived from the 
non-relational, or what Deleuze calls the disjunctive synthesis, are apparent 
between nomination and the being, or between consciousness and the object. 
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Thus, this non-relational synthesis suggests that thought relates to the Being 
that constitutes it.
We can thus clearly state that what Deleuze considered as Heidegger’s 
limit is that his apparent criticism of intentionality in favor of a herme-
neutic of Being stops halfway, for it does not attain the radicalness of 
the disjunctive synthesis. It retains the motif of the relations, even if in 
sophisticated form.
(Badiou 2000)
Heidegger’s limit did not stop at the ontological interpretations of intentional-
ity and consciousness, but rather extended to his attempts at explaining the 
essence of technology through accusing humanism (Dupuy 2008).
HEIDEGGER VS. WIENER: ERRORS AND LIMITS
The main dispute between pioneers of cybernetics and phenomenology came 
in their interpretation of the impact of technology on our lives, and perhaps 
their fear of it reaching a point of overwhelming the human being and eventu-
ally cultures. Norbert Wiener (1961: 29) wrote in critique of what he called the 
modern industrial revolution referring to the incidental contribution of the power 
of information technology:
Perhaps I may clarify the historical background of the present situa-
tion if I say that the first industrial revolution, the revolution of the dark 
satanic mills, was the devaluation of the human arm by the competition 
of machinery. […]. The modern industrial revolution is similarly bound 
to devalue the human brain, at least in its simpler and more routine 
decisions. 
(Wiener 1961: 27)
It is important to clarify the context in which Wiener derived his thoughts on 
the decentralized power of information technology. During World War II when 
Britain was under Nazi air attack, Wiener developed a computational device 
with automatic aiming and firing for war aircraft. Therefore, he was referring 
to the power of information technology used in war. Since then Wiener advo-
cated blurred boundaries between humans and machines that open an infin-
ity of possibilities (Rosenblueth et al. 1943; McCulloch 1974). This vision of an 
open-ended infinity of possibilities for the relationship between humans and 
machines was the concern of cyberneticians, and for Wiener it represented an 
incarnation between God and man (Wiener 1988).
Critics of classic cybernetic thought observed that cyberneticians have put 
power and control at the centre of the definition of their philosophy relating 
technology and man to religion and God (Haraway 1991). Peter Galison (1994) 
speaks of the shift from classical cybernetic thought to the postmodernist cybor-
gian manifesto addressed by Donna Haraway as she focuses on the variability 
and the unfixed nature of the cyborg not as the unlimited power, but rather 
for the partiality of what is human.
As she put it, we are ourselves already in so many respects cyborgs 
through our reproductive technologies, our psychopharmacologies, our 
prostheses (mechanical and computational) – that we can no longer 
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put any stock in essentialist definitions of the classic dichotomies of 
mind and body, animal and human, organism and machine, public and 
private, nature and culture, men and women, primitive and civilized. 
(Galison 1994: 261)
In essence, the writings of Wiener on the potential of information technology 
to devalue the human brain and at the same time referring to the integra-
tion between human and machine as an incarnation between God and man 
were the main points of critique that Heidegger sought. Thereafter, Heidegger 
(1977b) decided to take on the complex subject of untangling and explaining 
the difference between technology and the essence of technology, and by essence 
he means enduring as presence (Lovitt 1977: 3).
Heidegger (1977b: 13) does not explicitly state what kind of technology 
he is referring to when attempting to formulate the meaning of technology; 
however, later, he notes that according to the Greek definition, there are 
two meanings: the first is Techné relating to activities and skills of the crafts-
man, and the second is Techné that belongs to bringing-forth or to poiesis. 
Historically, technology has been defined as a means and a human activity, and 
can therefore be called the instrumental and anthropological definition of technol-
ogy (Heidegger 1977a: 5). However, Heidegger (1977a: 12) relates those means 
to an end and instrumentality to causality, and establishes that technology is not 
a means but rather a way of revealing.
Heidegger (1977a: 26) connected revealing to truth and the essence of 
things to the origins of their causality, and argued that the destining of reveal-
ing is a mode of Enframing that he refers to as supreme danger. Furthermore, he 
states that technology itself is not dangerous; however, its essence is, as it is 
destining of revealing and Enframing:
The threat to man does not come in the first instance from the poten-
tially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has 
already affected man in his essence. The rule of Enframing threatens 
man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into 
a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more 
primal truth. 
(Heidegger 1977a: 28)
Heidegger’s questioning of the essence of technology is ontological rather 
than sociological. Despite his assumption of the lethal impact of the machine 
or the apparatus of technology, his main fear is that the essence of technology 
is enframing being. Andrew Feenberg (n.d.) explains Heidegger’s technological 
concern by stating:
Humans become mechanical parts in systems that surpass them and 
assign them their function. They begin to interpret themselves as a 
special type of machine. […]. The role of humans in the revealing of 
being is occluded. We no longer wonder at the meaningfulness of 
things. The system appears autonomous and unstoppable.
Not only Heidegger but also Gilbert Simondon, a French philosopher 
known for his theory of individuation, has critiqued Norbert Wiener’s theory 
of cybernetics, and later developed a general phenomenology of machines. 
Simondon criticized Wiener’s cybernetics as a theory of technology for 
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accepting classifications of technological objects operated by established 
means and criteria with certain genera and species, which he refers to as 
the main thing that any theory of technology must reject (2009a: 7, 2009b).
In his essay on Machinic Heterogenesis, Félix Guattari (1993: 13) criticizes 
both Heidegger’s and Wiener’s positions on technology. He notes that the 
relationship between human and machine has been a source of reflection 
since the beginning of philosophy. Guattari refers to Aristotle’s consideration 
of techné as a creative mediator between human and machine to create what 
nature finds it impossible to achieve. He argues that Wiener believed in the 
mechanistic conceptions of the machine by assimilating it to living beings, 
while Heidegger assigned the mission of unveiling the truth to techné setting it 
ontologically, and by doing so has compromised on its definition as a process 
of opening. Therefore, Guattari establishes that by oscillating between the two 
schools of thought:
[…] we will attempt to discern the thresholds of ontological intensity 
that will allow us to grasp machinism [le machinisme] all of a piece in 
its various forms, be they technical, social, semiotic, or axiological. With 
respect to each type of machine, the question will be raised not of its 
vital autonomy according to an animal model, but of its specific enun-
ciative consistency.
(1993: 13–14)
NOTIONS OF HUMANISM, MACHINISM AND TECHNOLOGY: 
THIRD WAY ARCHITECTURE 
This thesis follows Guattari’s thinking regarding the conception of an oscilla-
tion between two methodologies: cybernetics and phenomenology. Moreover, the 
thesis distinguishes between Wiener’s cybernetics and Heinz von Foerster’s 
second-order cybernetics where the observer becomes part of the creative proc-
ess through participation. From the previous sections above, it seems that the 
dispute between phenomenology and cybernetics is more fundamental than the 
question of technology. It is in fact a dispute over notions of humanism, machin-
ism and information that this thesis takes the position of addressing, no longer as 
a dispute but rather as a third way conception for the architectural discourse. 
To unpack this entangled prosthetic system is to involve current contri-
butions to the fields of both technoscience and post-phenomenology. However, 
before attempting to reach the conclusion of this article, it is vital to clarify 
some crucial points that have contributed to the later development of techno-
science and post-phenomenology. To continue with the build-up that this article 
has attempted, the question of technology and its impact on our lives has not 
merely been a recent concern. Early surrealist writers questioned a world where 
machines will start thinking (Pias 2005); this was followed by a response from 
the cybernetician and neurophysiologist Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts in 
their famous paper on the Logical Calculus of Ideas (1943) where they provoked 
the question what if our thinking is already done by machine? (McCulloch and 
Pitts 1943). Claus Pias (2005) in his essay on Analog, Digital, and the Cybernetic 
Illusion describes McCulloch’s techno-philosophy to be:
[…] subverting or deconstructing several hierarchical differences like 
human and non-human, subject and object, psyche’ and techne’, man 
and apparatus.
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McCulloch’s techno-philosophy challenged other philosophers’ thinking of tech-
nology; from Freud to Nietzsche and McLuhan where technologies meant an 
extension of man, McCulloch blurred the notion of man, which was in ques-
tion in Kant’s What is Man? and Foucault’s statement concerning the death of 
Man (Pias 2005). The reality is that cognitive scientists and neurophysiolo-
gists have always been concerned with the mechanization of the mind, not the 
humanization of the machine (Dupuy 2008). This question of humanization or 
inhumanization of man and machine was the concern of many philosophers 
and writers, such as the phenomenologist Hannah Arendt. Arendt (1958: 231) 
expresses her critique of science and technology describing it as rebellion 
against human existence:
Natural sciences have become exclusively sciences of process and, in 
their last stage, sciences of potentially irreversible, irremediable, ‘proc-
esses of no return’.
Jean-Pierre Dupuy, French philosopher, friend of both Francisco Varela and 
Heinz von Foerster, and advocate of defending the essence of humanism against 
the excesses of science and technology, relates technoscience to cybernetics 
and both to metaphysics through the act of calculating:
Technoscience, insofar as it constructs mathematical models to better 
establish its mastery over the causal organization of the world, knows 
only calculating thought. Cybernetics is precisely that which calculates – 
computes – in order to govern, in the nautical sense […]: it is indeed the 
height of metaphysics. 
(Dupuy 2008)
Don Ihde, a post-phenomenologist and a philosopher of science and technology, 
argues that technology does not determine the human condition, but rather:
[…] humans using technologies enter into interactive situations when-
ever they use even the simplest technology – and thus humans use and 
are used by that technology, and all such relations are interactive – the 
possible uses are always ambiguous and multistable. 
(2002: 131)
Dupuy’s informed view of phenomenology and cybernetics led him to the 
conclusion that both fields were vital for the existence of one another, as 
the questions that their followers raised and are still raising are fuelling a 
historic debate over humanism, machinism and technology. Ihde (2009: 38–39) 
developed the theory of post-phenomenology as an approach to technoscience 
revealing such theory through the history of material technology (such as 
Stone Age tools), through to industrial technology (such as electricity, rail 
systems, factories etc.) and finally information technology (such as comput-
ers, the Internet, mobile communications and other media), which he refers 
to as technoscientific. 
Ihde addresses the ultimate convergence between the two methodologies 
in question in this article – cybernetics and phenomenology – where he points 
out that since technologies are historically older than humans and contempo-
rary technologies are technoscientific, the way to critique and philosophically 
investigate this relationship has to be phenomenological – or what he finally 
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terms post-phenomenological, as it unveils the variety of the human experience 
of technology (2009: 43). 
Implications of such convergence are already evident in the participatory 
art practice, interactive architecture, cyberspace, virtual realities, neoplasmatic 
designs and prosthetic/posthuman entities; all have contributed a great deal to 
creating parallel selves and other architectures where technology was and will 
always be at the heart of their creation. Instances of architecture, currently and 
historically, have had a close association with humanism. They were formally 
considered as mere sheltered environments, and towards the start of the 
industrial revolution the field took machine-like trajectories (Banham 1982). 
This approach was later criticized in favour of architecture that is more linked 
to the human sense of space (Bachelard 1994). Two decades ago or so, with 
the start of the age of information technology, architecture began to allow for 
collaborations with other fields such as computer science and participatory art 
practice influenced by the cybernetic methodology (Pask 1969). Since then, 
such collaborations have become widely practiced in architecture (Spiller 2006; 
Cruz and Pike 2008; Hensel et al. 2006), which has fuelled a phenomenological 
critique of the emerging architecture accused of anaesthetization of the architec-
tural practice (Leach 1999) in fulfilling technological experimentation detached 
from the human senses (Pallasmaa 2005b). However, if we look beyond the 
computer-generated images that are wallpapering end-of-year shows and 
exhibitions, such technological experimentations are far from being detached 
from humanism, but rather they create constant dialogues between humanism 
(through participation and interactivity), machinism (through experimentations 
and interdisciplinarity) and technology, to heighten the human experience. 
This article has confirmed the importance of two critical points: the 
first states that the dispute over technology has contributed to sustain-
ing philosophical debates and arguments, and the second asserts the vital-
ity of the oscillations and the convergences between the two methodological 
approaches adopted for this thesis to enable a third way philosophy of archi-
tectural discourse to emerge.
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